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TEXTE EST UN CON 
Gajah sama gajah herjuQng. ptiandok mali di lrngaJHlngah. 
When elephants fight , a mouse-deer in the middle will be killed. 
THE stimulus for this collection ofessays was, I understand , a difference of views 
between Needham (1973) and Dumont ( J 979) over th e significance or contex t 
and concepwai levels in classifica tion . With the sage advice o f the Malay 
proverb in mind , rather than s tand between elephants, this mouse-deer proposes 
to view matters from a nearby clump of little-penetrated intell cClUal 
undergrowth . From this vantage-grou nd it looks as jf the battle-ground is as 
often used as it is odd. So, from the (somewhat spu rious) sa fet y of my chosen 
thicket, I shall feel fre e [0 cast aspersions far a nd wide . I [ is a little reminiscen 1 of 
the a pocrypha l story a boutJean Genet. When , after th e intervention of leading 
French intellectuals, he was released from ' perpetual preven tive detention' for 
burglary, he was asked what he felt about [he nation's ce lebrated philosopher, 
J ean-Paul Sartre , having devo ted a book to him (Saint Gentl, comlditn et martyr). 
H e is sa id to have replied sim ply: 'Sartre eJl un ,on!'-so preserving his existential 
purity. For more humdrum reasons the brunt of my paper might be summed up 
as lexte eJt un ,on. 
A serious d ifficulty in much anthropologica l argument is (ha t the re is no 
satisfactory theory of con lext. 1 This is th e more awkward as a major 
I. My foc us is a lilli e different from the olher essays in th is collection, as one of the roilOrs, Dr 
Barnes, asked me specifica ll y La comment o n some of the theoret ica l issues of con tex t and It\ cis. I 
hope ,he rC$uh \viJl nOt be: entirely irrelcvaOl . The paper I originall y pre~c n\cd at lh~' Oxfurd 
conrerence on 'Conle:otl a nd Levels' (8 - I , M a rch 1983) was 100 lo ng for inclusion here, lind so has 
been split into three. The fint sec tion on problems ortexi and cont c:ot t isgi vcn here. The second , on 
IrUlh-conditi onal sema nti c ahern3tivcs to a contextual account, will appear separately. T he !lnal 
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contribution of anthropology- popularly known from the work of 
:vJalinowski- ·has been to show the importance orcomex l in almos[ any aspec t of 
culture. A reason for thc difficulty, I shall suggest, is thc curious relationship of 
context to a text. Text req uires context, but appeal to cont ex t involve.. a kind of 
confidem:e trick- for everyone invokes it but no one knows quile wha t it i:-. This, 
rightl y, makes cri tics susp icious that the whole busincss is a 'ca n'. So it may be 
worthwhile to conside r why (he conccpt of cont ex t is problematic. 
''''hat then is context? Etymologically 'text' is usually traced to the I.atin for 
'tissue', and so 'context' to what is woven togdher (Onions Ig66: 9[ 3, 209 L 
con!exluJ being a 'conn exion, order, construction' (Skeat 1963 : 132 ) and lex/us 
being someth ing woven, as the stru Clllre o f a narrati ve, so g iving th(' modern 
'tex t' (Partridge Ig66: 6g8). Put this way va rious questions ar ise : what kind of 
\....cb or tissue is being woven? About what is it wovl'n? And what conn ec tions, or 
orde r, is being construe ted? At eac h turn context appears as incomplete and 
himing at someth ing else as its focus: activities, ideas, speech, texts or whatever. 
III some sense, almost anything can serve as a context for something else. The 
problems sta n, however, if we try to dassify such relationships to find Out what is 
'e.<;sent ial' to them. For co ntext is just an a nal ytica l convenience designed for a 
particular purpose, but ,here is a danger ofil being seen as so mehow substantive, 
or co mpleme nting something subs(a nli ve. Now, if we treat contex! as a kind of 
thing, we run into difficulties when we try, so ( 0 spea k, (Q pick it up only to find , 
as th e Ba lin ese put it , thal it i~ 
Sd.lldi Il/!,Ombfl sCf!,oro 
likt· !{raspillg the ~t'a. 
There arc other perils. J t shou ld be clear, from the etymology if"nothing else, 
{hat cont cx t has metaphorical roolS. How dt'ad arc these? lf com exi is mere!} a 
sy nonym for relationship, orde r o r !<. truc ture, why use a term with cOllnotat i oll~ 
of weaving, encompassing: and o ther, often confused, im ages~ Th erc is (at least ) 
onc inte res ting ambiguity in th e mctaphor of"wclJ\' ing lOgc thrf. ,'\ re \ '1e to take it 
as a co nfluence, or connect ion, ;j nd st ress that p.Hts ca nllOt full y be d ist ing l1ished 
from the whole (both ant:' Ihing and a nother )? Or i ~ it a conjullctio n, or 
complementarit y, \vhi"b Iweds dist'ntangling ( fithu Ollt'" thing Of anotht'r )? Ou r 
Hellenic inteHect ua l tradition is comforlal>le with diehotomic 's tlwa potht'osis 
being perhaps the I\ri .<; totelian laws of thougIH- n'en if th t' world does not 
always divide up ncatly. T he- study of COlltcx t is torn bct\..·t'en rl'l'ogniting a 
range of possible me taphors o n the onc ha nd , a nd submiuing to the din 'Ht:'s of 
classifica tion and logic on the other. In this bailie, cont ext oft en lands up as the 
len-ove rs at the tabl e of tt'Xt, with a cu ri ow;] ) left-looted sta tlls or ils own . 
Sadly, Ihis is nat yet a ll . Ir it is unhelpful to view con text as a discriminable 
class of phenomena , let a lone as nca ll y opposed, o r contfasted . to something else, 
is this laller set at least exclusive? Unfo rt unately what is 'not a' is not necessa rily 
b. Such pseudo-dichotomies are regrettably popular ways of making an analysis 
part 011 a pus.~ibk· dpp rnach to ('I)I1IO: l(( will appl'ar in a (ilrthcumillg t'ullrcciUll of c1.~" ~s I'milled 
Con/ut (lIId .\I.-an/f/g 11/ Snulh Hr.!1 ;If,n , M . Hobart :tnrt R . T a)lor I. <"ds. l , London: 50.-\$ PrC"' s. 
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seem to work . Consider, for inst ance, how often 'emotion' is definf:d by coni rast 
to 'intellect ', instead of a negative ly defined rag bag (Rofl y 1980; Needham 
I g81). Likewise, Levi-Strauss lumps together almos t every fi gu re of speech not 
subsum ed und er metaphor as metonymy, as if it were a coherent , Or even 
homoge neous, class (cf. Ho bart t982a : 53) . Such slUff are edifices made on , if 
Aec lingly, for a lso 
We arc such stuff 

As dreams are made on, and Our lictl t" life 

Is rounded with a sleep. (Tht TtmptJl, IV .i.14G-8) 

'Vhile some wait prostrate for a revelation at thc altar ofcOntt"xt, ot hers have 
been busily rubbing their lamps to summon up the mo re co-operati ve, if 
promiscuous, spirit ofcex!. Ind eed, cu ltu re itself has rt'cently been Ife-aced as a 
meaningful text, capable ofspa\vning its own contcxt (Geertz 1973, borrowing 
from Ricoeur, e.g. 1970 a nd I 971 ). This kind ofapproac h is of interesl, nOI leas t 
because in the R icoe urian version the relation of tt:'X t <t lld CO ntext is treated as 
the dialect ical aspect of the hermeneutic ci rcle and promises a solution to the 
problem. The argument is a lso able 10 draw upon the li ve ly debate in reee nt 
French 'POSt-structuralism'. Unfortunately this is <lisa the poi nt at which it sta rts 
to emerge that diffe ren t protagonists use th c samc key co nn:p ts , like text, 
discourse and meaning, at times appa renlly unwittingly in qu ite different wa )' S. 
To the exte nt that Ihe debate ilselfis a tex t, it is one into which e\'e ryone reads 
some th ing different or even incompatible with other views. Perh~lps a beller 
metaphor {han wai ting for a god 10 appea r is build ing <t tower to the heavens 
only to discover Babel. 
This talk of metaphor touches on an important point. Culture is not a text 
(however understood), nor a sec ofruJes, nor even a di ...cou rse. II may be useful 
for a specific purpose to rega rd cuhure, for a moment, as if it were a text, a 
d iscou rse or whatever; a nd members ofparticular cultures may write tex ts, hold 
discourse and ac t acco rding to ru les . But cu lture is complex and CannOl be 
caplUred in any single meta pho r. Such melaphors may prove more or less 
illumina ting: 'structure' has faded in favour of ' tCxl' , itself ofte ll - a nd I think 
wrongly- confused with 'discourse',2 Now the ue3LOr.<; of these metaphors may 
be clear as to what they are doing- Ricoeur and Foul:ault write elegan tl y on 
figures of speech-but one suspects that not o nl y a re th(' ir acolytes oft en less 
discrimina ting, but that the masters, iffor no other reason than tha i committing 
oneself to develop one view of cu ltu re prccludes o ther possibilities. end up being 
maste red by their ow n metaphors. 
7. Except to ch(' most disciplined intcllcccufil asce tic, ....,ho ca n delM h thc lechnic:t l us<' uf CctOiS 
entirely from natural language (in which case why botht:r to burro\\' ' pre-conscrailled' imagt·s al 
all? ), th e choice of words has impJi ca li on$. To me, at least, 10;( h <l.~ cnn notations of(ixit~·, Ct.hcfrne"l· 
and mea ning, wherea~ discourse suggestSdiYcrgencc ofopin iuns, negotiabili ty and argument find so 
is a qut'stion of power. Thcse implicil tio ns of metaphors <lre, of courS(", disc ussed ill Kuhn ( ' 967 ). 
where they <lre referred 10 <lS 'par<ld igms' (M asterma n 1970). Kuhn h;\Ssinel' T('phra~ed his U~fi~t' fu r 
the history of sciene"e (sce Barnes , 982 ). 
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What I am leading up to i!:i (he seriou!> problem of translat ing between 
cultures, not ur.akin to the historian's problem of inferring the significa nce {in 
Hirsch's sense, Ig67} of ideas in different epochs. Without, I think, begging the 
question , our own theoretical con!HrU<:I!' ha ve their own comexl~ , in (he se nse 
lhal our concep ts and permissible logical moves are products of a particular 
c ultura l tradition . I I cannot be a.'isurned a priori thaI all cultures construe notio ns 
like c ulture, text, discourse, rule and so forth, in the same way. The obviolls 
relort 10 this is that these theoretical lOol5 are the expensive products of 
reflections and of tested efficacy, which do nor depend upon the ways any 
cu lture may struc ture, coherently or not, such explicit notions as they may 
happen to have . Unfortunately, this argument is more convenient to the 
£trmchair philosopher than it is convincing to the necessarily more cmpirical 
ethnographer. It is not so much a question of wielding cosily forged intellec tual 
tools, as it is (as even the mO-"1 hardened Popperian might admit) ofconsidering 
how universally va lid are the assumptions which inform our complex, 
articulated theoretical models. Notions like text and discourse can, on a little 
probing, be seen to p resuppose a theo ry of the relation of thought, word a nd 
obj ect, ideas about meaning, a th eory of action and intention, ca nons of 
rationJ.lity, and even a view of the relation ofman and society. To each age these 
might appearas self-evident, but one oflhe few certainties in this world is that at 
-"orne fUlUre date present theories will be seen to hide some prell y shaky 
assumptions, As I shall try 10 show, theories of text and discourse are shot 
through with presuppositions more glaringly ethnocentric than their 
protagonists would ever dare admit. Renecd ng on one's navel may he great fun, 
but how much does il lell o ne about what an Amerindian makes ofa shama11's 
chant? 
Lastly, let me brieny contextualize the problem of context, as this will be 
relevant later. There are two traditional theories of truth which may also, as the 
question of how language fits the world, be rephrased as theories of meaning. 
Now , such well-worn dichotomies a s nature and culture, Naturwisstrischajitri and 
GeisteJwiJStnJchajitll, cause and mean ing aTe no t unconneCled with theories of 
truth. To pUI it simplistically fo r present purposes, Correspondence Theory, 
which stems from at least as far back as Plato, a rgu es that truth consists in some 
form of correspondence between belief, o r language, and facl. By contra st, 
Coherence Theory, more popular with the ra tiona lis lSI holds that a statement is 
tru e or false depending upon whether it cohe res or not with a system of other 
stateme nts. The latter underwrites many of the b ra nd s of conrexwalism in 
anthropology and elsewhere. M uch of the complaint of hermeneutics, that the 
huma n sciences involve understanding (VtrJlthm). not just explanation 
(Erk/ijrUl ). ma y be see n as Ih(" objection of coherence theorists to the narrOw 
strictu re that truth mus t be found solely in some fil between the world and its 
formal representation in statements, formulre or whatever. The counter to thf 
correspondence view (espoused, for im-lance, for sc ientifi c theories by Popper) is 
a more holistic approa ch which st resses the need fo r analysis of the fit between 
statements, so involving somc theory of rationality or logic (a rgued for science 
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by Duhcm a nd morc recent ly Quine). Thus the problem of context is linked 10 
the wider debate about the nalUre of truth and meaning in different 
philosophical traditions. 
With these general rcmaTh out o f the wa y. we can turn to loo k in more detail at 
some of the problems in formulating a theory ofcon text ill cu lture. 1 Perhaps the 
most thorough di-"cussion is to be found in ' post-s truc turalist ' writings on the 
natureof 'tex t ' and its relation 10 societ y and the individu al. A sui tahle .qaning­
point is Ricoeu r 's argumelll for treating cu ilure as a text, which can be 
contrasted wilh the differcnt views of Barthes, Fo uca ult and Derrida in 
parti cul ar, in order to show some of th e drawhacks of a foe u .... on text, or ever. 
discourse, and- despite their avowed reflexivity- thc diffkullY in cs<.:aping 
certain presuppositions of We~ilern metap h y!>.ics. I co nclud e wit h l"(lnarks on 
why a theory ofconte:H is so hard to formula te and suggest one possible .,>olution . 
Theories of text, like canned foods, come in man y varieties. Of especial 
interest to anthropologists, however, is the v ie ..... o f 'meaningful action 
considered as a text' ( the sub-t itle of the o rigi na l puhlir.atioll r1971 JofRicoeur 
1979). His point is to show Ihe relevance ofhermeneulics as a general method for 
the human sciences. To do so, hc sets out to show that action has si milar features 
10 TeXt and that they are tractable to th e !'a me mcth odology ofilllerpretalion. 
The connection belween [ext and action hriefly is as lollow!>. . Dis(our~t' 
consists of speech events, but whal is im portant is 
.. the rntaning of thc speech eVCll t, not Ihe C\TIlI as en' lll (Ricocur '9 7~r 76; 
emphasis added ). 
It is [his meaning which is insc ribed , and so 'fixed', in writing or texL This 
'objectification' of discourse as text is also rrue of ac tion hy virtue or its 'in ner 
trailS', which are similar in s tructure (ibid .: 8, ). The re are four criti cal paralkls 
between (ex! and action: 
I . The units of discourse, and so lext, are senLen('es whieh havc proposi ti ona l 

coment. In dec rcasing measure they also ha vt, in speech act tcrminology, 

illoeutionary and perio('utionary forcc . ACTion.' have a similar rorm (hc::rr Ri(O('ur 

Iibid.: 8 t - 31 relies upon Kenny ) 963), ' j'he (on lem a nd forccs togCt her (On:;ti tlile 

the mea ning of the text or action. 

2 , Text is distanccd from the author's ori~;n a l ;o(c,"ion and develops 

consequences of ils own (Hirsch's '!>igniflea nee', 196]: 8) , jusl a~ anion docs, 

history being its 'sedimentation' in institutions (Ricocur 1979: 83-5)· 

3. Meaning rurther surpasses even ts by virtuc of th e p O ....'CT or rcfercll ('e. 'j'ext:" 

rercroriginally 10 silualiom (an Umwdt) in whi ('h they arc proci uced , hut havr: the 

capabi lity of referring LO other (possible) worlds in which future read eTS li v(. In 

fact' the world is the ensemble or rererences opened up by the I(:Xt5' (ibid.: 79; thi:" is 

J. Not all th(' approac.hes call be deal! with here , (or inslanrr ~vr(;r h an IIlCorir s or .hr Batr:>c >n­
\o\'ildcn c('ological vicw, which I discuss in the papa on .ruth·condit iona l SC nl ll lltiC5 rdrrrt'd 10 ill 
(00111011; I above . Some o( my f(Jmmem~ bt'low ha ve. howcvcr. , 11\ ob";OU5 hcaring O il tht'~f 
arg umcn l :'. 
the encompassing ""elf ). Analogously , thc meaning of an important action 
transcends ' the soc ia! conditions of its production and may be reenacted in ncw 
soc ial contex ts' (i bid .: 85-6). 
4. Dis('"ourse also rdcrs back to the spcaker, as well as to a pu tative listener. In 
text this becomes part ly delacbcd. so 't he verbal intention of the tex t' takes over 
from the author's intention (ibid .: 90; ef. 19;6: 12-'2'2 ). whi le a plethora of 
possible readers are created . Likew ise, the mea ning of a n action becomes detached 
from Ihc actor and bccomcs 'the sense' ofi ls fo nhcoming interpretations' through 
time ( t 979: 86). 
The objec tivity of meaning, independent of its original vehicle, is the v it a l link 
brlwee n tex t and aoion. 
The fre e~standing nature of mea ning is ce ntral to Ricoeur's argument that 
hermeneutics is the appropriate method for the human sciences. Dihhey's 
difficult y in distinguishing explanation , a!' the proper aim of natUral science. 
from understanding ill human sc ience was lhat Ih e lal ter required spec ial 
recognition of the psyche as <In irreducible element in the a nalysis. Ricoeur 
propo!'es overcoming the dichotomy between ca usal explanatio"l and 
und erstanding meaning by recourse to a dialectic in which the meanings, once 
undersood , ca n be tested objectively for relative va lid it y by a logic of probability 
(ibi d.: 90-'2; borrowing from H irsc h 1967), which he holds ca n meet Popper's 
criterion of pot ential fa lsifi abi lit y ( t 959). The reverse process moves from the 
scient ific valid at ion of meaning to the possibility of new understandings. Once 
agai n reference i:- the key. \OVhen the lex t is dis ta nced from its original selli ng, it 
may t:'i ther be treated as a world less eill it y- this is the comfortable world of 
structura lism-or (and Ricoeur impl ies such an option is incomplete) it may be 
shown to disclose a new world, remOte from th<J\ of it s inception, in which the 
sense of the text (in Frege's idiom) implies a new se t or references (Ricoeur [9 79: 
94 - 8). The goal, [hen, is the discovery of the 'dep th~sem antics ' of th e tex t, 
which is its sen,c;e detached from its author (ibid. : 97-8). finally , there is 
somc thing similar in action and soc ia l phenomena to this seme, for equall y, 
..socia l strunures arc alw allcmpts to ('"ope with ex istential pcrplexities, human 
predicaments, and dcep~roo tcd eonniets (ibid.: tOo ) . 
Text, ac tion and social Structure ultimatel y speak of the human condition . 
Ricoeu r o ffers a fascina ting -"yn thesi s ofcu lt ure~a~~tex (. As I remarked ea rl ier, 
however, we mu st enquire furt her into what this model presupposes and enwils, 
at which poilH nasty drawbacks and grave inconsistencies come 10 light. There 
are seve ral obvious issues which invite invest iga tion. How alike are text a nd 
aclion? \Vh ich theory of mea ning, a nd of th e relat ion between word and object, 
is in vokrd, and what are its im plica tions? How far is Ricoeur commilted to a 
view of truth and human nature? How transpa rent are the metaphors in the 
model? What is his theory of context ? And what is the di alect ir [hrough which 
Ricoe urian hnmr.neulir... works? Such questions draw out uncomfortable, and 
even C' lilnocenlric, assumptions behind the ar~ument. 
How alike a re text and anion? There is one simple- difference. Actions, as 
events, arguably have effects in the world in one -,,(" ose independeOl of a 
mediatin,Q; 'mind ' . Obviously Ihe relationsh ip bt'tV\'een evcnts is relc\ 'a nt in 
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respect to some framework, or paradigm (see Goodma n 1978: 1 - '2'2,91 - 140), 
but would one wish to go so fa r a ... to say that the co nsequences of actions do not 
ex ist in a ny se nse pr ior to being recognized? Are, for instance, the effects 
(immediate o r l ong~t erm) of the Blitzkrieg 011 Londo n cn tire ly on a par wit h the 
text ofk leill Kampf? Second ly, ifall ac tions are like hiI.H>fl ex l, (h r. n IllOSt n r them 
are mammothl}' boring a nd repe titi vc:::, life ta king 011 th c baldness o r Ionesco's 
Prima Donna. Anyway, the sen tences of text are nOt isolated enti ties but are 
lin ked by logic (in a fa irl y strict sense ), na rrative conven tio ns, strUC ture an d so 
on , a mailer (tboul which R icoeur says littl e but, for insta nce , Foucau lt reg,Hds 
as critical (see especia ll y 1972), Even if we wcre 10 a llow ac tions propusit iolled 
COlHent~ how far are they linked logically, or can be said 10 havc truth value? ~ 
Yn R icoeur' .... scheme wh.u mak es an event , be it ullera nre or ac tion , reln'it llt 
is that it has ' mea ning' . \OVhateve r may happen later , this me:.ll1ing d erives fro lll 
iOlemion . Unfortunately inten tion is an a\vkw(!.rd anim(!.l, wbich h (!.!>o long het'll 
th e bugbear of hermeneutics a nd the philosophy o r a ctio n. Apart from the 
problems of establishing what an a uthor's inlentiom a re (Hirsch 196]). is it to be 
treated as a n inner sta te or inferred from public br. ha\·iour? \1u~ 1 it bt' 
conscious? Call one have conflicting intentions! III short , a~ \\'ingenstein has 
po inted out ( 1958: :214 - 1 9~ t95~r 32 , J 47) , is it a coherelH no tion at a ll ? 1\ 11 this 
pa les beside the problem of how different cuhurt's mighl co nstrue intent ion 
differently, and how its analogues, if th ey exist , are disti nguished from wishing, 
willing, decidi ng, or even accepting fate, or wha tever. It would look a bit :, ill~ if 
hermeneu tics, in trying to understand othe r cultures, had to import thc curren t 
bailIe in \"' es tern phi losophy abou t intention as a deus ex macltina. Some ru lt ll r('~ 
do have differing notions ofac tion and in tention (Mar rio tt [976; Hoba rt 198'2 b. 
1983)' So are we no t committing a ca tegory mis t<Jk e if we subs titutc what \,,'e 
choose to regard as intention fo r whalthey understand by the: id eas they use? 1\ 
hermeneut 's 101 , to paraphrase W.S. Gilbert , is no t a happy one! 
The nub of Ricoeur 's link of text and action is that bo th ha ve 'propositional 
cont ent ' ( 1979: 81, 82 ). This view is as traditional as it is questionable . For a 
srart , it is far from clear th a i it is usefu l 10 posi t such abs trae t e ntitie ~, bea rers of 
a n even more abs tract ' mea ni ng', a s propositions (Quin e ' 953a; [~HO) .~ T he 
more interes ting truth~condjtional theories of meaning do no t, in raC t: deal with 
pro positions as thei r obj ec t but ""'ith semcnces (Davidson 1967a; tg67b). Nor, as 
Ricoeur notes, does the stud y of propositions incl ude a ll that is re levan t for an 
analysis of culture. It is becom ing increasingl y clear th at la nguage alone is 
suffic ientl y heterogeneous that nOI even s peech~ac t theory ex haus ts the subjec t. 
J a kobso n, as one example, isolated six functions of language, combina ti ons of 
which can be distinguished ana lytically in any sentence ( 1960). Language- as 
--t . Rejecting a co rr~pondcncl' theory of truth docs not nt"n :ssaril y ~a l vage Ri(Ol'u r 's a rguml·n t . [t 
j ust requires us to consider the cri teri a of coherence......a rranted as.,erlabilit y, and mOil , ill \,'h,t(nT r 
theo ry is used instead . A!, .....e shall sec, such an option is not c,l$il y open anywa)' . 
5. It is not nc("cs-~<l ry here to ('o nsid cr the debate b('tweell Su aw:lon ( 1950; t 9.l'J) a nd Quinr 
( 19531» on how formallogic<ll sys ((:m~~ hotlld Ix. It is enough to 11 0(\· tha t bot h rcjc('l Ihesll'C$~ UpOH 
propositio ns. and point to the need for cont ext, a lbeit in dilkrcnt wa ys. 
I 
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indeed an and otlter form ... omiltcd by Ricoc.:ur- may exemplify, expre...... or 
reprc~ent, l y~ically , commonly and so on, something as somethi ng else, in a way 
which does nOl fil easily in a propositional, or speech-act , theory (Goodman 
1978: 12ff.; see also Lyons 1977). To reduce language and action 10 propositions 
is radler like entering a wrestling comes t in a straigh t-jacket. 
H the stress on propositions is questionable , the idea that text or actioJl 
'contains ' something is dangerous. This is a beaudrul illustration ofwhat Redd y 
calls the 'conduit metaphor" where language is trealed as a vehicle which mu~t 
thcrefor~ (oma in something, be it meaning, .<;en.,e, proposit ions or OIh er sim ilar 
caments ( 1979). As he notes, there is noth ing intrin.<;ic 10 language which 
requires ilto be vi ewed in this way, and there are serious objections to doing ~o. 
Regardless ofwhether one chooses lO rega rd such metaphor~ as 'constitutive', in 
that the subject-mal1er is ineluctably constituted in part by the image. or ideally 
dispensable as part of 'c1ea ring tropes a way' (Quine 1979: 160) to make room ror 
knowledge, implicit reliance on a 'conduit metaphor' is a t best perilous, at worst 
nonsense. II is one thing to say that , for a given purpose, it is useful to rega rd 
language as a contai ner . II is quile another lO assume that some onwlogically 
'objective' entity is necessarily contained in text, let a lone hold thaI this is in fact 
the perd uring realit y behind culture.6 
In one sense, {he foregoing is a ncill a ry to Ricoeur's ceOiral concern willl 
meaning, which is what , in the last analysis, links texl and action. So what kind 
or theory of meaning does his argument use? It is not, in fact, easy to say. At 
differem stages rheories of propositions, reference, intentions, speech acts, 
context and use-otherwise considered incompatible contenders-all feature. 
The aim of this synthesis appears lO be nOI so much lO reAect 011 the 
contradictiom, as 10 argue for Ihe generality and many-racedness of meaning. 
Unfortunately there is biuer disagreement among schools of hermeneutics, 
which stress meaning, as to how it is to be understood (Hoban 1982a; 198".2C;. 
The difficuhy is neally highlighted by one orRicoeur's main exponents, Geertz , 
for whom symbols are the veh icles of meanings, a symbol being 
..anything that dcnotes, describes, represcms, exemplifies, labels, indica1es, 
evokes, depicts, expresses- · anything that somehow signifies ( lg80: 135)' 
This looks a little like rhe Charge of the Hermeneutic Light Brigade. \1ean ing is 
prepared lO leap the obstacles that worry the more pedantic. As it is hard to see 
how almost anything does not, on some reading, fulfil at least one or Geert z's 
ve rbs, presumably everything is symbolic and therefore meaningrul. Th is does 
rather deprive meaning of any mea ning. Such a broad definition happily makes 
6. Rieoeur also make1 greal pla y on other s(" IS of melaphors. Ide-as are gin-n an imprC'Ss ion of 
subsl<ance thc)' would othcrwiS<' la(.:k in the usc of spa lial metaphors ( ;nside:out~id e: 
imc:ri orization:vl(crlorization ; distancial ed ; open up Ihc world \. These \·crge to\.'ards lhe 
substantive allimu (discount is 6x('d. or inscribed: ;H' lions stdiment). untilthc IC,>; I be-comes a mlXk 
human ( lhe intt:mion oflh(' tt:xt. what d lex t sa }'s). Filla!!). il ('Olnts 10 life- (possessing for("e: h;1\ illg 
power 10 disclose) and is even charmingly bourge-ois in ils inlt"rcsl in pmpeny Iand appropriating ). 
Thj.~ might b(" harmk~s wtr, il nOI lhal Ih\" n'ality of I("XI. al,d Ihc rorrc~POl1ding unrralit~ of 
eont('XI, is more the result of tln- writn 's imagillalion than of 111(" ·prop("rties· of lex I. Trxls. afta ;:tIl. 
do not ~peak; men in l ulturt r('ad them . 
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meaning seem to occur almos t everywhere and so. intuitively , il emerges as a 
pervading feeling in the landscape, so to speak. This is, ofcourse, by virlue of the 
sweeping definition in Ihe first place. Perhaps there are rewards for so hard­
• worked an intellectual faclotum . 
I 'Whcn I make a \Vord do a lot orwork like that; said Humpt y-Oulnpl:-" " always pay il eXIra'. (Th,ough the Looking-Class) Behind Ricoeur's concern with carving our a broad domain ror meaning, there lies Ihe specific problem of how meaning relates to the world . Simple as itI 	 might seem, this is one of the thorniest issues as, at the least, it involves a 
triangular relationship of word (name ), concept (sense) and reality (thingl .? 
Now the French Saussurean tradition conccnlrates on the rel at ionshi p orwords 
(here as text ) and 5e:1se, which leaves the difficult problem of how either of these 
relates to the world. More than most POst-structuralists, Ricoeu r races the laller 
question in order to account for the peculiar capacity of text to appl}' in differcnt 
situa tions. For reasons we shall see, he grounds himseJrin Frege 's ramous. but 
difficult and disputed distinction between sense and rererence . As Ricoc ur 
interprets it, 
The 'what' of discourse is its 'sense', the 'about what· is il.~ ·rcCcrenrc' ( 1976: tg). 
Sense is the meaning immanent in discou rse, and thus in text ; whereas 'reference 
relates language to the world' (ibid .: '10) . II is exactly how language relates lO 
(he world which has prove n so difficult to specify fully . 
There are twO aspects of th is problem which are worth briermentioll be-cau.<;e­
they bear on context. Ricoeur produces a modified ver~ion ofFrege to copc with 
Strawson's ( 1950) critici sms or lhe Russellian interpretation : 
...1he same sentence, i.e ., the same sense, may or may nm refe r depending on the 
circumstanc.es oTSilUa tion oran act ordiscoursc. No inner rna rk, indeptndtnl oflht USt 
of a senltnce, constitutes a reliable criterion of den0l3tion ( 1976: 'w; emphasis 
added) . 
As Geach remarks, there has been 'a sad tale of confusion' (1980: 83) 'bet,veen 
the relationsofa name to the thing named and ofa predicate to what it is truc or 
(ibid.: '19). Ricoeu r's emphasis is not on denotation ('the relationship that holds 
between raj lexeme and persons, things, places, propcrties, pro(.;csses and 
activities e:-<ternal to the language-sys tem' (Lyons UJ7T '207J) . but 011 rererence 
which is ' the relationship which holds belween a n expression and what lhat 
expression stands foron particular occasions ofits uttera nce' (ibid .: '74 ). On the 
one hand , this commits one to some version of wha l Parrel has ca lled 'the 
Augustinian-Fregea n piclure theory oflanguage' ( 1980: 80) , which raises all rhe 
problems of th e status of imaginary objecls, logical connectives and so rorth (see 
Hobart 1982a). On the o ther hand, reference involves somc nOlion o f context ill 
which utt erances are made . It has been finding a suita ble theo ry or contcxt 
which has proved hard (see Parret 1980: 73-96) . Unfortunately, because it 
f 7. The t erm~ in parenthcsc~ ("fcr 10 t.:!Jman·s usage ( 1962: 57) drawing o n Ogden and Ric h"rd~ 
t936: II. Sec also Lyons '977: 9611". for ano tlH:r of the many formulations. 
r 
j2 Mark Hobart 
loo ks much easier 10 handle , there is a widespread tendency 10 focus upo n text 
and its sense rather than upon the range of socia l COntexts in which tex t is used. 
As Ha rr is has pointed out ( [983). theoretica l linguists (and one might add 
philosophers) deal with a highly idealized view oflanguage, the homogeneity of 
speech communities and the ability of speakers. and by decomcxtu a iizing 
discourse ignore is..'wes of power and Ihe conditions in wh ich la nguage is ac tua lly 
used. 
The second issue is about truth a nd human nature. Ricocur requ ires that texts 
ha ve mean ing, o r se nse, by virt ue of being true of t;,C world in which the aut hor, 
and the potent ial reader, lives-in other words some version of a 
Correspondence Theory . At the ~ame time, the intention of the author, and later 
the verbal intention ofthf' tex t, are crucial , so he le a n ~ towards Grice's theory of 
meaning as recognized inten tion. As this has been deve loped , the stress is upon 
unders tanding being linked to a pa rticular utterance in a particula r COllle xt, 
depending upon the presumptiC'on of shared s tandards of communi ca tion and a 
degreeormutual knowledge (Grice ' 975 , 1978;see Sperber and Wilson 1982 ror 
a n inl eresting development of this approach ). Such a stress on con text is likely to 
be uncongenial to Ricoeur in several ways. II ci rcumve nts, and indeed 
questions, the relevance of truth a nd reference in fa vour orconvemion, but in 
such a way as to de-ce ntre tex t and emphasise the complexit ies of context. To 
what ex tent is embracing both Frege and G rice like trying to have one's ca ke 
and ea t it? 
It is for these reasons amo ng olhers, I suspect, that Ricoeur grounds himsel f on 
a particu la r view of human nature and truth . ] f th ere is a constancy in the 
human condition, it may be argued that the diversity or cu ltural conventions 
and individual circuInstances do no t allect the capacity of tex t to address it~elfto 
the human ity of the reader. In a sympathetic reading or Ricoeur , Donoghue 
points ou t that in (his view of text , 
.. the reader wants to restore tht'" words to a source, a human situa tion involving 
speech, cha racter, pcr.;onality, Cl nd dcstiny cons trued as ha\'ing a personal form 
( 198 L: 99) · J 
This tradition he designa te'S<epireading' (from the Greek tpos, speech ) by which 
o ne moves back from texl La persons and shared experie nce. Iiuough which we 
'verify the axiom of presence' (ibid.) of common humani ty , and re'ach through 
words towards 'the abor ig ina l situation' (ibid .: (51). The a lternative, 
'g raph ireading' (from graphos, wrilingL to which we sha ll come shortl y, prefe rs 
to focu s a ll discourse ra the r than the self, and questions the search for true 
intentions in men , or meaning in texts. 
Thc single , truc interprcta tion is an autocrat 's dream of power (ibid .: 199) . 
Leaving aside the questions oflhe 1wo traditions o f reading ror a moment , it is 
necessa ry to a~k to what R icoeur is commiuing himself. \"'hat a re the 
imp lications ofg rounding an approa ch in a theory ortrurh , l:'llld a " iew of human 
nature? It is one thing fo r mathematica lly-mind ed philosophers like Frege an d 
Rus.~ J1 to wish to fix meanillg to truth about the world ; but if one wishes to 
inquire how men in different c ultures, or historica l periods, unders tand the 
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culture or world about them, such a theory hecomes distinctl y un comfortable. 
For among the main ques tions men may wish to ask is: what is human nature? 
And what cons titutes truth? To the exten t (ha t Ricoe ur hases his theo ry of 
meaning upon a theory of truth and human nature, i( becomes im possihle fo r his 
brand of hermeneutics to inquire ahout these, because they are already 
assumed. Should suc h an approach altempt to commen t on, let al one arg ue tha't 
life co nfirms the va lue of these theor ies. it runs the d a nger of begg ing the 
ques tion.8 
Finally, o n this view what is the relationshi p between explanation in the 
human sciences and (he dialectic? For, as H irsch pUIS it , 
The special problem ofi nrerpretation is That it vcry often tlppenrs to bc necessa ry 
and inevitablc when in fac t it never is (1967: 16.t; emphasis in the origina l). 
The danger is ever-present that the interpre ter 
... has been trapped in the hcrmeneutic ci rcle and has fClllen victim (0 ,h(' self­
confirmability ofinlcrprctations (ibid .: ,65), 
R icoeur's reply is that the hermeneutic circle is thc 'first figu re of a unique 
dialec tic' ( 1979: 88) in which 
Guess and va lida tion arc in a Sense circularly relatcd as subjective and objec ti ve 
approaches to the tex t (ibid. : 9 t ). 
What is suggested is two dillerent ways or looking at tex t. 
Now in its class ical rormulation, the hermeneutic circle 
... has been describcd as the inte rdependence of pan and whole: the whole can bl." 
undenlOod only through its pans, but the pans can only be understood through 
the ,,,holc (Hirsch 1967: 76). 
In other words, and this is wh at is releva nt for the Ricoeurian version , to 
understand (pan of) a tex t onc must understand the contex t, but to unders tand 
the co ntext one must understand the text. In term .> of our earli er dis tinc tion of 
popula r th eories ofmeaning, on the one hand the a ll a lysis oftexl pu St deals wi th 
its correspondence with something ou tside, while on the other it dea ls with its 
coherence with other texts. From one point ofview the advance orhermeneutics 
is tha t meaning cannot be squeezed entirel y into tither correspondence or 
coherence theory. The problem is, how are the tWO rela ted? Ri coeu r's answe r is 
through a dialectic) treated as an oscillation . This is not so much a rational step 
from a thesis to a n antith es is, as a stress 011 different ways of looking at things. 
The shift from dialec tic as logical to a metaphor for perspective, ra ises 
immediately the question of whe the r there are necessarily on ly twO views, and 
whether (hey must be related by formal logic. Pa rt of the persuasiveness of the 
image or the dialectic, I suspect, is that it is the simplest form oran alternative 
meta phor. Ra ther than look for the whole trut h from a single pe rspec ti ve, or 
8. The problem may be PUt anuther way. Jfwe require a theoryofhum an natufe tude.·U Un! fur Ihe 
-na lure' of eu llure, wh ich in lurn ill uminates the perenni a l problem ufhumans hy "irtue olthC"ir 
nahlrcs- arc we nOt caught in 3 circulari ty? 
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two, there may be many points of view , the relations between which will depend 
on onc's interes ts at th e time. 
At the start ofrh is paper I sugges ted that ideas like text , o r discourse, res t upon 
a.<;;sump tions about the nature of langu ;;,ge a nd tbe world , ra lionality, truth and 
o thers. The focus on text tends to de-ccntre COnlcxt, a nd {"ncou rage the scarch 
for something essenlial rather tha n a plurality .)f perspectives. The va lu e o f 
Ricocu r '.<;; argument is that, unlike many auth o rs, he has been a t pains to spell 
oul the assumptions upon which his argumenl is based-as indeed anyone must , 
in the last resor[ . In thi s last secr ion J wish briefly to b ring in three other 
ap proachcs to tex t and disco urse to po im to the different ways su ch conce pts are 
used, and to see \Vhat lig ht they shed on the problem o f context. G raduall y it 
should become dear \Vhy conlt'xt is such an elusive a nima l, and why 'logical 
levels ' are tarred wil h the same brush as comext. 
There is a schoo l o f thought which questi ons how possibl e il is lO fin d d [rue 
meaning in a text. Instead, one does not look beyond tcxt and cOl1lext for 
ultimate huma n verities , but recognizes that one is trapped within an endless 
web of pas t sig nifiGHions. Text, and by ex tension culture, is stud ied best b y 
distancing oncsclf and wa tching Ihe play o f possibility as o ne meaning 
immediate ly gives way to another . In his lat er phase, Barth cs has dismissed 
struc tura lism as half-hearted and has {"mbra~cd what Donoghue (in a hybrid 
neologism) calls 'graphir{"ading '. To Ba nh C"s, hermeneutic interpretatio n ofa 
lext is inadequate because 
This eon('('plion or th(' t('xt (the d ass i('a l, institutional , and the ('urrellt (,onreption) is 
obviously lillk('d to a metaph ysics, lha t of truth ( 198 1: 33). 
For, in lac t, 
Any t('xt is a tis~u(' of past ci ta ti ons. Bi,,,, of ('odes, formulae, rhyt hmic models , 
fragments of"so(' iallanguagcs, ('Ie. pass inlo Ihe leXI and arC' redisl ributC'd within it , 
for there i ~ always language b('fore and Mound the ICXL ... Epistemologi('ally, the 
(,oneept ofinteTl ext (th a t is the tex ts of the pr('\'iolls and surroundi ng culture ) is 
what brings to the theory of the lext th(' volume of socia lity .. (ibid .: 39) . 
Text, in thi s sense, h as two Clspects: 
The phenOl ex t is 'the verbal phenomenon as il prcsenls i Ise lfin Ih(' structure of the 
concrete sla lemeO[ ' ... whcrcas the genolex t 'se ls (Jut the grounds for th(' logical 
operations proper 10 lht" rOnstillit ioll of the subject of the r lluneialion ': il is 'the 
place of"stTUeluration oftll (' phenotex l· .. (ibid.: 38. ci ling Krisln(t 197'2: 33:") -6). 
All culture is {reCIted as a set o f text", con tex t me-rely bei ng the other t{"xts . Behind 
Ihis surface Cl re the logica l rules acco rding to wbirh texts in any s),s t{"m ;l re 
st ruCl ured. The struc tura list legacy is clear. A!' \ve sha ll see, however, the study 
of text is nOt tht' dispClssionate !'cien r. e it often claims to be, but a dank, pri\'a t{" 
or ifice into which it is conven ient 10 crawl to ig nore th e complexities of context. 
G ranted lhi ~ definition, Barthe~' foc u .~ is Clccordingl y o n the text not as a fixed 
elllity but as a methodo logical field . The differen ces betwt'{"11 tbe 'c lassical' and 
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Banhea n views can be represent ed as: 
thing---+ process 
p roduct---+prod uctivilY 
t TU th ---+ pia y 
Where Ba nhes differs from Levi-Slrauss ia n structura li sm is in th e refusa llO step 
beyond p lay ro ground text in an y definite structure (of which play makes a 
mocke ry). Language has free play and is nO( to be rooted in a K an tian view of 
being reducible to the innate ope rations o f the human m ind . The implicit 
metaphysics of m uc h theory is rejected in favour of metaphor. For 
.. text can be approacht:d by definitions, but also (and perhaps above all ) hy 
metaphors (lg81: 35 - 6}. 
Wirh the positivist sea rch for truth undermi ned by metaphor, we a rt" cast free at 
last on [h e sea of language. 
Perha ps the mOSt ext reme critic o f ' Iogoce ntri sm ' ( the st ress on th e orig inal, 
meaningful word or reason behind ({"xt ) is Derrida. The brunt of his attack i:i 
(l,gains t what he sees as the Western obsession with 'the metaphysics uf p resence' . 
This putS primacy on the search for an original truth , reac hable by 
consciousness and subjec tivit y, an ideal voice spea king behin d the wf'b o f' 
significa tion, hinting a t what is truly so as being p resent to a per"oll. \"ie ilre 
caught in an endless play between the signifier (words) and the signified (ideas) 
as we seck th{" unattainable. 
Pure prescnee or self .. proximity is impossilJlc, and Ih lTciore we dl'~irr it. Gi\ il1g U J.l 
this desire, we should engage in (he play ofprescO{'(' and a bsl'nce, folIa,,! tha t ('anIlOI 
be comprehended within a met a physics or an ontology (Oonogllll l' ]9B I: tG ( , 011 
Derrida). 
To date Nietzsc he has offered th e most radical c ritiqu e of being and t r uth, 
H eidegger or metaphysics, and Freud of consciousne s.~ and ident ity (Derrida 
1972: 250). But these critical discourses a rc trapped in a kind of ci rr it" , For 
ThUt is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysin in order 10 atl<lck 
metaphys ics. We have no language - no syntax .\Od no lexicon whid] I:. ali l' 1I to 
Ih is history .. (i bid .; emphasis in the origin;:,I ). 
Anthropology does not, as one might think , otfe r a \\lay ouc. 
,.the ethnologist accepts into his diseour.) e the premises of ('Ihnorrntri ~m at ,h (" 
very moment when he is employed in d c nou ncjn.~ them . This 1I ('("cssiIY i.., 
irreducible; it is not a historical contingency (ibid .: '25'2 ). 
Derrid a offers us a Kafkaesque world in which we must shunt <lround ror ever in 
the prison ofour metaphysics. Our a ttempts to {"scape require us to use wha t we 
arc trying to escape from . So we must shuttle bac k and forth between !'ignitit:r 
an d sig nified , constantly being redirected as we search for an answer. 
The alte rnative, it seems, is a desponden t world where text and context weave 
into a closed tissue. Before co nsidering whelher the fate oflhe anthropologist is 
as g lum as Derrida paims it, i[ is useful to stand back and refleci on the problem 
from the point ofvi{"w ofa bis torian such as Foucau lt. Starting also from our own 
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philosophical lradit ion, Foucau lt po ints out that it limits the possibilities of 
knowledge 
... by proposing an ideal truth as (he law ofdisroursc a nd an immanent ra tio nality 
as (he principle of their unfolding .. ( 1981: 65). 
BUI this rationality, which unde rp ins the Ricoeuri an relation of thought, word 
a nd objec t, and of text and rea d er 
.. is on ly a di scourse that has a lre ad y been held , o r rather it is things themselvC's, 
and 1:\'(,11(5, which impercept ibly tUfn (hcm~clyes intodiscoursc as they unfold the 
sec ret of their own UJ~ncr (ibid .: 66; emphasis added). 
Ir may nOI be language which is the tTap but the assumption (hal there is an 
esse nce behind discourse. Derrida tend s to presuppose that words ca n only be 
used in o ne way . As Donoghue is at pa ins to point o ut, the Styir.s of diffe rent 
autho rs express their diffe rent a I titud es to la nguage an d its possibilities. 9 There 
is more than o ne way 10 skin a cat- o r a lext. 
'What complica tes Ihe issue is that differen t a u thors have rather different ideas 
o f what it is they are talking about. All react against thc structuralist, and 
ullimately Saussurean, form al ism. Derrida questiolls the superiorty which is 
accorded to concepts (the signified ) over signs (signifiers); Barthes focusses o n 
the play of text a nd intenext. Ricoeur , in particular, points to the preoccupation 
with signification a t (he expense of the far more complex relation of predication 
whic h o perates at the level of the se ntellce as the un it o fdi scou l'se and text. Fo r 
Foucault, however, discourse is not at the 'level ' of speech (palole) at all. 
A <;tatemenl belongs (0 a discursive formalion as a sCOIence belongs 10 a le:...:t, and a 
proposition to a deduct ive whole. But whereas the regularity or a sentence is 
dcfi ned by the la\\:s ofa language (langue ), and that ofa proposition by the laws or 
logic, the regularit y of stalemeniS is defined by the di!;cursivc rormation itself 
( 19 j'2: 116) . 
Against Ricoeur, Fou ca ult sees discourse as not frozen inco text, 
.. 3 mere inlersee tion or things and words ... a slend er surface or contact, or 
roufrOOIatioll, bctween a realit y an d a language (longut). the inlrication of a 
lexicon and an experience ... (ibid .: 48) . 
It is an empirically id en tifiab le domain between la nguage and speech . Against 
Derrida, Foucau lt argues thai discou rse 
... is not a n id ea l, timeless rorm that also possesses a history ... it is, from beginning to 
end , hislOrieal --a fragment of hi story, a unity a nd a di scontinuity in history itsclr, 
posi ng the problem of its o'....n limils, il s divisions, ils I ransfoTlnat ions ... (ibid .: I t i ), 
Discursive formations frame the ways in w hich knowledge. langu age, texts a nd 
so forth ca n be understood in a ny histo rica l period. Discourse is nOl stable . It is 
tra nsformed by virtue of a complex pJa y between its contradi ctions and intern a l 
logic on th e o ne hand , and processes o f power on the OIh er, which a re in turn 
rephrased in the transformation. 
9· 'Truth , rar rrom being a sokmu <lnd S('\'('rI,: mastcl', is a docile and obedient S('T\a nl ' (Goodman 
1978: 18;'. As, on at kas! one rc-.:l.ding, language gai ns me'aning b~ rt'rcrcncc to truth , I find it 
imerrsling to see ho\\ Goodman'~ obscn'a tion looks i( om· slll)o, tituu::. '1;Inguagc' (or ' truth ' 
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Foucault is conce rned not to lose sight of the contextual wood for the texlUal 
trees. In his later works especia ll y, he stresses the conditions ofdiscoursc and the 
relation of discursive freedom and power. On this overview, pace Derrida , 
Discourse transmits and product'S power; it retuforcc<; it . but al.~o undcrmilles and 
exposes it, rendcrs it rragilc and makes it possible 10 thwart il (1978: lOt ). 
Among the ways in which discourse is tamed and its kaleidosc.opic possibi lilies 
held in check are the sea rch fo r the 'truth' behind the words (o ft en identified 
with the au tho r's intent iotl)' a nd the exclusio n ofsome discou r~es as the product 
of madness, and ofOIhers as heing improper (sex uality or violence, for instance), 
sacred, esoreric, erc. Finally, the re are inte rnal proceuurcs whi ch serve to 
cl assify. order and so limit what is admissible, such as th e 'd isc ipline' imposed on 
what is acceptable in academ ic discourse a t any lime ( lg8 t: 56). Discourse is no t 
our priso n . R a ther 
We must conceive discourse as a vi olence which we do to things, or in any rasc as a 
pract ice which we impose on them; and it is in this prartice thai Ihc eVcnl~ or 
discourse find th eir regu larit y (ibid.: 67). 
Instead of depending on terms like significa tion, originality, unity and c rra tion , 
we can loca le the reality ofdiscourse as an epistemologica l e ntit }' by subs tilUting 
respect ive ly: condition o f possibility. regularity, se ri es (seque nti a lit y) CJlld evem 
(ibid .: 67 - 8). The key analytical concepts are 
... no longer Ihose or consciousness and continuity (with their corrc!ati\'c problem:" 
or rreedom and causa lity ), nor any longer those or sign and structure . They a rc 
(hose orlhe event and the series, along , .... ilh the play or the notions which arc link<'ct 
to (hcm: regu la rit y, dimensions or chance (alea), di.~eonlinuity, dependence , 
lran sformation .. (ibid .: 68). 
Ricoeur and Foucault bOlh use the notions o f discourse and text , but they 
understa nd q uite different things by them. 
T o pulilhe strands together: what progress, if any , has been made in clarifying 
w ha t are tex t a nd context? To Foucau lt , Derrida is trapped in the Saussurean 
view oflanguage a nd the metaphysics oftrulh a nd presence he himselfhas gone 
1O such lengths [Q condemn. Ricoeur's esca pe from sem io ti cs in to semantics ends 
up equ a lly in reifying, at limes deify ing, text w it h its link to truth through a 
consta ncy in human na ture ) which ignores history and cultura l diffe rence- in 
shoTt, contex t. Even the desire in which Barthes and Derrida wish to ground 
discou rse is itself histo rically constituted-a point Girard has made against a 
Freudian fund amentalism by point ing out that desire itself is learned by 
imitatio n ( 1977; 1978) . One is reminded at this stage ofColli ngwood's shift from 
Ihe tradition of Dilthcy and Croce he sh a red with Ricoeu r to a hi sto ri c i.c;m in 
which text must be interpreted in it s hisLOrical context ( t946 ). Context, as 
perspective, is cr itica llo Collingwood in another way. A na rrow framework o f 
space a nd lime are typical o f science and arguably a sense of the rea lit y of text . In 
a broad frame th e opposition oflext and reader, o r culture and the indi vidu al , is 
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transformed so that society and the individua l no longer appear as ontological 
ent ities, but are seen to be constituted toget her, mUlUally defined. and changing 
(Collingwood 1945; see also Rorty J976) . /\ narrow frame stresses (he apparent 
reality of that dangerous Durkheimian dichoLOmy of individual and society. 
The difference between epireading and graphireading boils down 10 which olle 
puts first. It is rather like a ch ild at breakfas t wondering whether to open his 
bo iled egg at the pointed end. or lUrn it upside down and crack the base. 
A remark might be made in pass ing on metaphysics. Derrida has commented 
on the limitations oran anth ropology which expo .ls its own metaphysics. As we 
have: seen, these include culturally specific nmions of being (presence), 
rationality and truth. How unavoidable are these constraints, so we cannot but 
view other cultures in our own term s? There is a historical approach­
represented here by Collingwood and Foucault- which argues for the 
possibility of distancing and reAexivity (of a kind quite different from the 
phenomenologists' man thinking about his own origins and nature). I[ is an 
empirica l question how far o ther cultu res have different metaphysical schemes. 
The anthropologist's parallel [0 [he problem of histor ical understanding is the 
grossly undere:ilimated one of translation. There is, however, no ground for 
thinking wc can never esca pe the me ta phor of the prison-house ofour own ideas. 
Only in the short term do these seem stable. After all , one of the few certainties is 
that ou r ideas change. in pan as we reflect 0 11 our discourse. is there any reason 
the y ca nnot change by reflecting o n the discourse of others? 
Oddly enough, we ca n conclude quickl y. As early as 1940 Evans-Pritchard 
noted that anthropology deals in c rude concepts which denote relationships. 
Any advance must include 'relations between these re lations ' ( 1940: 266). Text , 
let alone comext, is not an objec t but sets of relations, the relationships between 
which are complex . The wtakness of semantic theories of implica ture is in 
managing to define relevant co ntex t, be it linguistic, social or interactional. On 
aile side the subject under discussion constrains the likely range of what is 
pertinent. Against this, differen ces in roles, interest, po\\.'er and perspective 
make the potential contexts differen t fo r those involved. Text provides appa rent 
continuity; context the possibility of difference . The claim that there is a truth, 
in text or whatever, implies a kind of es.<;ent ial ism of g reat convenience [0 
political elites. So a stress on text, as against context, involves questions of power 
and prefe rence. The alternative d oes not enla il social life co llapsi ng into a 
nominal;sl nighlmare, because for mos t purposes rough ex pectations exist of 
what are the 'normal' (see Cavell '969 ) kinds of relationsh ips likely to be 
brought imo play_ Situations may , however, always yield. new possibilities as 
they are viewed from fresh or unusual perspec tives 'in a new context' . This 
possible creativity and openness make co ntext negotiable. Spheres traditionall y 
as different as politics, religion or a rt may become the fi eld for , o r means to, the 
play of different views. To d.efine contex t subs tan ti ve ly is to ignore the human 
imagination. 
How does this discussion bea r on the question oflevels? Dumont's insight was 
that, in India , the opposition between ideas and institutions of power and of 
ritual purity are encompassed at a higher logical leve l, o r position in a 
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classificalOry hierarchy, by purity as a core concept. Th(" difficulty of dual 
ciassificalions, he suggests , is that they ignore po!'sib le asymmetry between 
membe rs of a class, and also the wider hierarchical co nt ext of classification 
(Dumont 1979) . 
\·Vhat has context, a s underslood here. to do with levds? For a s tan, 
encompassing is a contextualizing move. It seeks to s truc ture material in a 
hiera rchica l class ifica tion, so thai a species a t one level may be also the 
classifying genus at anOl her. This presupposes that rea lilY has levels, or Ihat 
cultures work by hierarchica l taxonomy, o r lhat lang uage contains log ical 
levels . The first is ran kl y essentialist and overlooks the role of the observer. The 
second raises ques tions abou whether taxonomies are necessa ril y hierarchical 
(Conklin [964; Needham '97S ), whether a culture can have o nly or.e taxonomic 
principle at work, a nd whetht:r all cultu res share iu tntira l principles. The last 
involves a dubious view of language and ontology (see Rus.sell '903 ; Wilden 
[g80: [' 7-24; cf. Godel 1965) . We must also be careful as to eXi:l.c tl y what is 
involved in that loose no tio n 'opposition '. Croce criticizcd Hegel for confusing 
what is opposite and what is distinct ( 1915 ). Ideas wh ich a re logica lly opposite 
can be synthesized; ideas which are distinct can no t be assimilated to the same 
scheme. Before purity ca n encompass power we require evidence that they are 
opposite , not just distinct. So it is one Ih ing for Dumont lO argue that 
hierarchical taxonomy is empirically ev ident in I ndian id eas of caste- o r that 
purity and power a re fo r some reason of ,he same logical o rder in India--and 
quite another to argue that co nfusions or co ntradictio ns Can be resoi vrd in any 
culture in these ways without begging th~ queslion (c f. Dumon! 1979). 
Foucauh's point is that classifying is a notorious mea ns fo r controlling 
discourse a nd knowledge. So is classifica tory encompas..')ing a n objecti ve process 
dealing with fixed facts? Or is it a possibility, or a strategy, permitt ed by the 
system? Classification is a specia l kind ofcootextualizing move, for it enunciates 
which are the essentia l features a nd how they a re related. So it is a st rategic, 
indeed politica l, interpretation o f discourse. One cao see why the Brahmanical 
elite should espouse such a view. Are we to assume th a t a ll g roups agree and that 
there is no other possible perspective? Ethnographic evidence suggests there are , 
in fact , ot hers (Derrett 1976; Indeo forthcoming) . 00 broader theoretical 
grounds, it is unlikely that th ere is only one possible classifica tio n. As Quine has 
argued , any theory is under·determined by the facts, which rna}' suppon several 
alternative interpretat ions ( 1960). A classification is nOI so much a description 
or stru cture as an asse rti on or challenge, and pan of the argument about, and 
atrempt to legitimate, power. Just like the promotion of tex t, the focu s on 
hierarchica l taxonomies involves an attempt at cl osure , by virtue of 
unrecognized metaphors-here, of encompassing and leve ls. Realit y does nOt 
come in tiers, nor is it neatly packaged. Different groups may believe, or choose 
[0 argue, that it does. But then again others may nolo 
To conclude, I have suggested that the difficulties in formulating a theory of 
Context are linked to certain predilections in \Vestern thoughlo These include 
what have been called 'the metaphysics of truth', or 'of presc nce' , by which 
relationshi ps become viewed as pseudo-objeCls, and as th e observers', or indeed 
50 Mark H obart 
participants', relationships to what they see d e·emphasised and translated into 
'objective' facts in the wodd . The c.oncomitant danger is ofspawning spur iously 
substantive dichotomies in which overlap ping possibilities ('both /and ' ) become 
exclusive r either/of'). The comequencr is thai text and context are not part ora 
connected (issue, bUI opposed, and skewed so that text attains a reality at the 
expense of context. Sim ilar remarks might be made of the not unrelated 
opposition of individu a l and society_ Looking for the true 'essence' ofsomcthing 
disguises the extent to which knowledge is built up from a plurality of 
perspectives (a point made by Burke abou t irony. 1969). What is conveniently 
dismissed is the play of the imagination (see also Donoghue [98[: 171-2, on 
Barthes). Among the more powerful ploys of essential ism is a stress o n order and 
classifica tion, wheth er by seeking to define context, or by classifying reality in 
some determinate way. Society is not a thing, nor a la nguage, nor a text, nor ye t 
a discourse. These are metaphors which may b~ useful in looking at a problem 
for a particular purpose. To treat metaphors as substant ive is one of [he sins 
Dante forgot 10 include in his vision afhell. Those who do so in the end run the 
risk of being mugged by their own metaphors. One wonders if Jean Genet wight 
no t have approved their fale . 
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